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NOTES.
BANKS AND BANKING-STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY-ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE REPRESENTATIVES OF A STOCKHOLDER AFTER
DEAH-In a recent federal decision the executors of a stockholder
of a national bank were held liable de bonis propriis for the statutory liability adhering to the ownership of the stock. The testator
had died in i89o; one month later the bank failed. In 1892 the
executors paid all the debts proved or then provable under the laws
of the State and distributed the residue of the estate in accordance
with the terms of the will, without taking refunding bonds, and
filed their final account in the probate court of Delaware. The
report of the case does not state whether this account was confirmed
or not. The stock was never transferred from the name of the
testator on the books of the bank. In 19oo the Comptroller made
an assessment against the stockholders of the bank. In a suit
against the executors and legatees begun in 19o2, it was held that,
(369)
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under Section 5152 of the Revised Statutes, the statutory liability
for these assessments attached, by virtue of the insolvency of the
bank, even though in fact unknown to the executors, to the estate
of the decedent as a charge or lien in favor of the creditors of the
bank; that distribution of the estate without discharging such charge
or lien was a breach of trust or devastavit; that Section 5152,
though providing that the decedent's estate and not the executor
personally should be liable for the assessment, did not declare that
an executor should not be personally liable as a wrongdoer for
breach of trust; and that recovery could not be had against the
legatees.'
This case seems to be an undue extension of the trust fund
theory of Wood v. Dummer,2 and holds, in effect, that not only the
assets of an insolvent corporation but also the private assets of a
stockholder of a national bank to the extent of again the par value
of his stock, are a trust fund for the payment of the debts of the
bank. Yet the obligation or liability, whether held to be contractual
or statutory,' does not become a debt until an assessment has been
made on the stock by the Comptroller of the Currency ;4 after the
failure of the bank and up to the time the assessment is payable the
liability, while perhaps more than contingent, is not yet fixed 5 and
can properly be said to be potential only. Until the assessment is
payable no right of action exists upon this liability ;6 nor is the statute of limitations a bar thereto.7 Now in the case of the death of a
stockholder, title to his stock vests in his estate or more properly in
his legal representative.8 The latter, however, is owner in a representative capacity only; and, in the absence of any question of
devastavit, under Section 5152 of the National Banking Act the
liability as owner of the stock attaches to the estate and not to the
'Rankin v. Miller, 207 Fed. Rep. 602 (U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. Del., 1913).
23 Mason, 308 (U. S. C. C., Dist Me., 1824).
'In King v. Armstrong, 9 Cal. App. 368 (I98), the liability is held to
be "created by law"; in Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521 (1899), Deweese v.
Smith, io6 Fed. Rep. 438 (I9OI), Christopher v. Nowell, 201 U. S. 216, 225,
and Rankin v. Ware, 88 Kan. 23 (1912), it is held to be contractual; in
McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71, 74 (i9oI), it is held to be both statutory
and contractual. See 18 H. I_ R. 620; 25 Ibid. 189.
'McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71 (1901).
Rankin v. Ware, 88 Kan. 23 (1912); Whitaker v. Kershaw, 45 Ch. Div.
320 (Eng. 1890).
'Rankin v. Barton, 199 U. S. 228 (19o5); Aldrich v. Skinner, 98 Fed.
Rep. (1899) 375; Aldrich v. McClaire, 98 Fed. Rep. 378 (1899); Davis v.
Weed, 44 Conn. 569 (1878).
" McClaire v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154 (i9o5) ; the statute of limitations of
the State within which the action is brought applies.
'Parker v. Robinson, 71 Fed. Rep. 256 (C. C. A., Ist Cir., 1895); Zimmerman v. Carpenter, 84 Fed. Rep. 747 (1898); Davis v. Weed, 44 Conn. 569

(1878).
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personal representative." It is well established that the debts of the
decedent are a lien in equity upon all the personal property of the
decedent's estate.' 0 But such lien exists only in favor of claims or
demands which are due and payable or then due and payable at
a certain future time." It is difficult, therefore, to see how a stockholder's potential liability, before being fixed and declared due by
the'Comptroller, can be held to be a "charge or lien" upon the estate
of the decedent in the hands of the executor. To hold so it is to
regard the receiver of the insolvent bank not only as a creditor, but
also as a preferred creditor, before he has even a right of action.
Such a result, it is submitted, was not contemplated by the National
Banking Act in Section 5151.

The distribution of the estates of decedents is a matter within
the peculiar jurisdiction of the State courts.' 2 What amounts to a
breach of the executor's trust should therefore be a question for the
exclusive determination of the State courts, depending, as it often
does, upon the procedural statutes applicable to matters of probate
in the particular State."3 Further, a federal court which has taken
jurisdiction upon the ground of diversity of citizenship -must administer the law of the State in which it sits and is bound by the
Act of i8o4 1 to give such faith and credit to the records and judicial proceedings of any State, when proved in the manner specified
in the act, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State
from which they are taken.' 5 A federal court so sitting is also
So it
bound to recognize the State statutes which are applicable.'
seems necessarily to follow that, if an executor administers the
estate in the manner required by the law and usage of his State
' Parker v. Robinson, supra; Tourtelot v. Finke. 87 Fed. Rep. 84o (i898);
Blackmore v. Woodward, 71 Fed. Rep. 321 (C. C. A., 6th Cir., '895).
"'Davis v. Vansands, 45 Conn. 6oo (1879); Williams on Executors
(ioth Ed.), 1315.
uIn Dear v. Allen, 2o Beavan, i (Eng. 1855), the Master of the Rolls
refused to permit the executors to withhold a portion of their testator's
estate or to make other provision to meet a contingent liability upon certain
covenants entered into by the testator; in Wentworth v. Chevill, 26 L. J.
(Ch.) 760 (1857), the Vice-Chancellor refused to make provision for the
contingent liability of the estate for future calls that might be made upon
shares held by testator.
"Clark v. Guy, 114 Fed. Rep. 783 (19o2); Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S.
6o8 (892); but cf. Newberry v. Wilkinson, ig Fed. Rep. 673 (C. C. A.,
9th Cir., 1912), where probate jurisdiction was assumed on ground of diverse

citizenship.

"Cf. Robins' Estate, i8o Pa. 63o (1897); Piper's Estate, 208 Pa. 636

(904).

"Rev.

St. U. S., §905.

"Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Morgan, 76 Fed. Rep. 429 (C. C. A.

6th Cir., 1896); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (877);
Brewing Co., 2o2 Fed. Rep. 326 (1913).
" Maiorano v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 268 (1gog).

it re Benwood
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and cannot be charged with devastavit in the courts of that State,
the validity of his acts as administrator should not be open to collateral attack in a federal court. In our principal case, however,
it does not appear whether the executors were guilty of a devastavit
under the laws of Delaware or not. An executor is discharged only
by order of court, and not ipso facto by complete administration of
the estate." So in absence of such discharge he may be sued at
any time within the statutory period for the debts and obligations
of his testator. But if he has not been guilty of a devastavit in distributing the assets, judgment may be obtained against him only de
bonis testatoriis, even though execution thereon, as the estate has
been extinguished, is bound to be returned nulla bona.'s
P.N.S.
*
CONTRACT-EMPLOYMENT FOR LIFE-PUBLIC POLIcY-By the
weight of authority, an officer, director, or agent for a corporation
has no implied power to make contracts of employment for life on
behalf of its company.' But where such contracts are ratified by
the board of directors and are supported by a sufficient considera-2
tion they will be enforced. So in Cox v. B. & 0. S. W. R. Co.,
where the president of the company agreed to employ an injured
workman for life, if he proved competent, in return for forbearance to sue, and the contract was ratified by the directors in making
a payment to the employee under the contract, it was held good.
These contracts which by their terms contemplate a continuance
of the relation of master and servant for the life of the servant have
"'Davis v. Weed, 44 Conn. 569 (1878).
"Piper's Estate, 208 Pa. 636 (1904).
1In Brighton v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., io3 Mich. 42o (1894), it was held
that it was proper for the court below to allow jury to find that two division superintendents, who represented their company on the settlement of a
claim for personal injuries, had authority to make such a contract; but in
Maxson v. Michigan Central R. Co., 117 Mich. 218 (1898), it was held that
a division superintendent had no such implied power, distinguishing the preceding case on the ground that the company ratified the contract by paying
a sum of money to the employee. Accord, Nephew v. Michigan Central R.
Co., 128 Mich. 599 (i9oi) ; Laird v. Michigan Lubr. Co., '53 Mich. 52 (i9o8) ;
Beers v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 2o N. Y. S. 788 (1892), nor have trustees, holding
office for four years, such power; Carney v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 162 N. Y.
453 (igoo), president and actuary holding office for four years have no power
to make a contract of employment for life; but in Usher v. N. Y. C. & H.
R. R. Co., 76 App. Div. 422 (19o2), affirmed in i79 N. Y. 544 (i9o4), a
contract of employment for life was held good, since the company had retained the release and thereby accepted the benefit of the contract.
i03 N. E. Rep. 337 (Ind. 1913). Contract provided that "we will in
addition give you employment on this road, it making no difference who
may own it, as long as you live and prove a competent and worthy man, and,
if at any time you are thrown out of employment, you will receive your salary

NOTES

been assailed on several distinct grounds, 3 including that of public
policy, but none of these objections have prevailed in common law
jurisdictions. By public policy is meant that principle of the law
which holds that no one can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public or against the public good, which may
be termed the policy of the law, or policy in relation to the administration of the law.4 And it follows that an agreement inimical to
the public interests will not be enforced even though it might result
beneficially to the party who made and violated it.5 Therefore a
contract compelling a railroad to permit an employee to work under
circumstances which might prove detrimental to the public would
be void as against public policy on the ground that the company,
being quasi public servant, could not tie its hands by such an agreement.6 But in the principal case the alleged employment was to rufi
so long as the injured employee should "live and prove a competent
and worthy man," and in case of discharge he should receive his
salary thereafter during life, unless "discharged for neglect of duty
or dissipation." The company is therefore not required by the contract to violate its duty to the public, but on the contrary the conditions imposed therein sufficiently protect the public interests, and
vest the power in the company to discontinue the service whenever,
in its judgment, he should become "incompetent and unworthy,"
and, if discharged for neglect of duty or dissipation, his salary
should cease. Since the public interests were so amply protected
and there was an adequate consideration for the agreement, it was
rightly enforced as a valid contract, and this conclusion is in accord
with the great weight of authority in this country.7 And for the
as long as you live thereafter, unless your discharge is for neglect of duty
or dissipation."
'They are not (i) within the statutes of frauds, since capable of complete performance within a year. Pennsylvania Company v. Dolan, 6 Ind.
App. 1O9 (1892); Boggs v. Pacific Steam Laundry Co., 86 Mo. App. 616
(Igo') ; East Line & R. River R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70 (1888); (2) void
for lack of consideration, as an agreement by the servant to release the employer from liability for damages is a sufficient consideration to support a
promise to furnish employment. Pennsylvania Company v. Dolan, supra;
Hobbs v. Brush Electric Light Company, 75 Mich. 550 (1889); Sax v. Detroit,
G. H. & M. R. Co., 125 Mich. 252 (igoo); (3) wanting in mutuality, since
the servants option of putting an end to the contractual relation at any
moment is supported by an independent consideration. i Labatt, Master &
Servant (2nd Ed.), §§89, 91; Stearns v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 112 Mich. 65I
(1897); Rhodes v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 87 W. Va. 826 (igol); (4)
ultra vires. Bedford, etc., Co. v. McDonald, 17 Ind. App. 492 (1896).
'Greenhood, Public Policy in the Law of Contracts, page 2; Egerton v.
Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. i (Eng. 1853).
'Metzger v. Cleveland, 3 Ind. L. Mag. 42 (1883); W. Va. Trans. Co. v.
Ohio R. P. L. Co., 22 W. Va. 6oo (1883).
'Dicta in Pennsylvania Company v. Dolan, supra, note 3.
'Pennsylvania Company v. Dolan, supra, note 3; Jessup v. C. & N.
W. R. Co., 82 Iowa, 243 (189i); Smith v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 6o Minn.
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same reasons a contract of employment as long as the employee does
faithful work has been held valid."
Nor is an agreement by which one person obtains permanent
employment from another deemed to be against public policy, merely
because it has the effect of restraining the servant from engaging in
business as long as he continues in the employment.9 And it has
been held that an agreement by which one person agrees to serve
another for the term.of his natural life, in the same occupation, is
not invalid as being in restraint of trade, such a contract merely
limiting the servant's action in respect to the manner of following
the occupation.' 0 But such contract must be by deed."' It is, however, submitted that this proposition, though based on high authority, must at the present day be regarded as open to question,' 2
since in substance such a situation amounts to slavery, which is
illegal.

W. G. S.

DOWER-DIVORCE-CONvEYANCE IN FRAUD OF DowER OR ALI-

MONY-The courts of equity will protect a spouse against a voltntary conveyance by the other which will result at law in the exclusion of marital rights, if made pending an engagement of marriage,
without the other's knowledge prior to the marriage, even in the
absence of express misrepresentation or deceit, and whether the one
attempted to be deprived had knowledge of the existence of the
property or not. "The concealment of what it is the right of the
330 (i895); Usher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., supra, note I; Pierce v.
Tenn., etc., R. Co., 173 U. S. 1 (I898); but see St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co.
v. Mathews, 64 Ark. 398 (1897), in which it was held that an agreement
between employer and employee that the latter should not be discharged
without cause, there being no agreement on the part of the employee to
serve for any specified time, was not enforceable on the ground that the
agreement of both parties is necessary to fix the duration of a contract of
service.
8L. & N. R. Co. v. Offutt, 99 Ky. 427 (1896).
" Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544 (897).
"°MacDonell, Master & Servant (2nd Ed.), page 29; Wald's Pollock on
Contracts (3rd Ed.), page 481; Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W. 273 (Eng. 1837);
see Carnig v. Carr, supra, note 9. Under the Civil Codes of France and
Quebec a contract to serve for an unlimited period is invalid. French Civil
Code, Art. 178o; Quebec Civil Code, Art. 1667. In some jurisdictions the
length of the term for which a servant may lawfully engage himself has
been specifically fixed by the legislature. British Columbia Rev. Stat. (1897),
chap. 121 (Master and Servant Act), §2; California Civil Code, i98o; Louisiana Civil Code, Arts. 167, 168 (i6o, 161); Manitoba Rev. Stat. (19o2, Masters
and Servants Act); Ontario Rev. Stat. (1897), chap. 157 (Master and
Servant Act), §2.
"Viner's Abridgment, 323, Master & Servant, n. (5).
"Davies v. Davies, 58 L. T. 2o9 (Eng. 1888).

NOTES
one to know and the duty of the other to disclose, is itself a fraud
in law."' The American jurisdictions have adopted this rule, practically without exception, in declaring that such conveyances are
void as to the husband's rights in the wife's property, and as to the
wife's right to dower, either inchoate or presently accrued by survival. 2 England, however, restricted the application of the rule to
such conveyances made by the wife, 3 refusing the reciprocal right
to the wife upon the ground that a woman's marriage operated as
a gift to her husband of all the property, not settled to her separate
use, of which she was then possessed; but that she acquired no
rights in his property, as such, except the inchoate right to dower
in the property of which he was actually seised during the coverture.'
That declarations for the protection of dower rights, inchoate
or present, is the full extent to which the courts will go in declaring
this class of voluntary conveyances to be void is laid down in Deke
v. Huenkeineier,5 where the complainant asked that a deed of certain
realty executed just prior to the marriage, and without the knowledge of the fiancee, by the husband, without consideration, to a
daughter by a former marriage, be set aside upon the grounds of
(i) fraud upon her inchoate right of dower, and (2) that, in the
event of her husband abandoning her she would become entitled to
separate maintenance, or divorce with alimony, in either of which
instances she would suffer injury to her "marital rights" in that
his estate, which would form the basis of computing the amount
then due her, and to which it would attach, is diminished. After'Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 (1867).
Cameron on Dower, 266, 267; 2 Bishop on Married Women, 353; Petty
v. Petty, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 215 (1843); Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch.
482 (N. Y. 1821) ; Cranson v. Cranson, 4 Mich. 230 (856) ; Smith v. Smith,
2 Halst. Ch. 515 (N. J. 1847).
South Carolina stands almost alone in declaring such deeds absolutely
void and decreeing reconveyances, Brooks v. McMeekin, 37 S. C. 285 (1892) ;
while the majority view is represented by the ruling of the Kentucky courts,

as laid down in Petty v. Petty, supra, "To decree that the deeds be annulled entirely, would be to carry the relief beyond any possible legal in-

terest or claim that the wife has or may ever have: . . . a useless act,
by which she might never be benefited, as she might die first."
'Park on Dower, 236; Strathmore v. Bowes, i Ves. Jr. 22 (Eng. 1789);
Swannock v. Lyford, Co. Lit. 2o8 a. n. I; Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wms. 700
(Eng. 1732); nor was it confined to instances of where the husband knew
of the property, Goddard v. Snow, i Russ. 485 (Eng. 1826).

'Lush, Husband and Wife, 89; Strathmore v. Bowes, supra. However,

earlier writers refer to the wife as having the right to the protection of
equity in such cases, Gilbert, Lex Pret. 267. But the later writers and cases
have shown the settled rule to the contrary, so decidedly contrary in fact

that in Banks v. Sutton, supra, we find the court saying "And if this (defeating of dower) were the express purpose, it is an additional reason for
allowing it to have that effect."
S102 N. E. Rep. r059 (Ill. 1913).
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ruling that the deed was void as to her inchoate right of dower the
court said: "Even if the appellant's contentions were susfained and
the deed should be set aside and the title reinvested in her husband,
we do not see how it could be kept in him without enjoining him
from future transfers of it" in order to protect her rights to alimony, separate maintenance, and the like. "It would be absurd to
ask a court of equity, at the suit of a wife, to enjoin her husband
from mortgaging or selling his real estate, on the ground that the
wife might in some possible contingency want to file a bill for
separate maintenance and for alimony against him and that the land
would be required to satisfy the decree."
While the authorities expressly in point are few,6 yet they agree
with the principal case upon the ground that dower is a vested,
though inchoate right arising immediately upon the marriage, and in
the main not to be precluded except by her act or with her consent; whereas the rights to alimony or separate maintenance are
highly contingent and problematic, dependent first upon a violation
of the marital relations by the husband, and finally upon obtaining
a judicial decree allowing the same, and to defeat which many
things may arise.
Howeger, where those rights are no longer contingent but have
been ascertained before the bringing of the bill to set aside such
voluntary conveyances in fraud of marital rights, equity in grantalso provide for the protection of them in addition
ing the bill
7 will
.to dower.
J. C. A.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-WHEN SUIT MUST BE BROUGHT

-An employer's liability has always been a fruitful source of discussion and has been productive of a vast amount of legislation,
judicial as well as otherwise. The North Carolina courts have added
a new twist to the federal Employers' Liability Act ' by their interpretation of the section 2 limiting the time within which an action
must be brought. In Burnett v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.8 the
court held that though this section of the act says, "that no action
shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within two
years from the day the cause of . action accrued," nevertheless
since the law "confers no new right and is operative only to with'American cases cited in the notes above.
Decree for separate maintenance granted, Fahey v. Fahey, 43 Colo. 354
(19o8); and decree of divorce and alimony already granted, Goff v. Goff,
6o W. Va. 9 (igo6).
1Act April 22, 19o8, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65. [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911,
p. 322.]
2 §6.
379 S. E. Rep. 414 (N. C. 1913).
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draw from the company a defense theretofore existing," the clause
was merely one of limitation and therefore unless specially pleaded
would not be a bar to the action. Aside from the question as to
whether the act does confer any new right or not which is, to say
the least a doubtful question, the decision would seem to be an
extreme one.
The case admits, what is practically universal law, that where
a new right not known to the common law is created by a statute,
a clause limiting the time of enforcing the right is a condition precedent to its enforcement-i. e., the right ceases with the expiration
of that period. 4 And the court then argues that since no new right
is created, the cases laying down this rule do not apply. These
decisions do not say, however, that the creation of a new right is
the only reason for their holding, but merely that it is a sufficient
reason. And if we consider the basic and underlying principle it
will be found to be as equally applicable to the principal case as the
others, for though Congress in passing the act may not have conferred any new right, they have at least created certain privileges
or benefits, otherwise no one would sue under the act but would
merely stand on their common law rights. And that they have created something is admitted by the case which says that the act
"was designed to make it easier for employees to recover damages
caused by negligence." It is then ridiculous to say that a legislature
which could create a new right and limit it to a certain period, could
not limit this lesser benefit or privilege, and that one seeking to take
advantage of the benefit would not be bound by the limitation. This
is practically the view taken by the Scottish courts, who in enforcing
their Employers' Liability Act hold that the limitation is for the
protection of the defendants just as the operative part of the act is
for the protection of the plaintiffs and should be enforced just as
strictly.5
The principal case, in the opinion cites Upton v. McLaughlin,'
in which the following statute 7 was held to be a statute of limitation: "No suit in law or equity shall be maintainable in any court,
between an assignee in bankruptcy and a person claiming an adverse interest, touching any property or rights of property transferable or vested in such assignee unless brought within two years from
' The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886) ; Stern v. La Compagnie G. T., Iio
Fed. Rep. 996 (igoi); Radezky v. Sargent & Co., 77 Conn. iio (1904);
Elliot v. Canal Co., 25 Ind. App. 592 (19oo); Rodman v. Ry Co., 65 Kan.
645 (1902); McRae v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., ig Mass. 418 (igoS);
Neganbauer v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 92 Minn. 184 (i9o4); Hill v. Supervisors, iig N. Y. 344 (189o) ; Best v. Kinston, io6 N. C. 205 (189o) ; Martin
v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 227 Pa. ig (1gio); Lambert v. Ensign Mfg. Co., 42
W. Va. 813 (1896). Contra, Kaiser v. Kaiser, 16 Hun. 6o2 (N. Y. 1879).
'Johnston v. Shaw, 21 Sc. L. R. 246 (Scotland, 1883).
' IOS U. S. 640 (18i).

TRevised Statutes of United States, §5057.
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the time when the cause of action accrued for or against such assignee." This case would seem to be an authority for the decision
of the principal case, but upon investigation it will be found to have
been based wholly upon Bailey v. Glover,8 which merely held that
fraud until discovered, would prevent the operation of a similar
statute, and the court expressly stated that they did not consider the
statute of limitations as a part of the bankruptcy act. Under this
view the limiting statute could not be a condition precedent unless
specifically stated to be such, consequently the case could not be
deemed a precedent for the principal case.
T.S.P.

Am THE EQUIVAOF DETENTION?-A very interesting question in the law of
false imprisonment arose in a recent case decided by the Court of
Appeal of England.1 The plaintiff, a coal miner, went down on a
shift at about 9.3o in the morning for the purpose of working for
the defendants, his employers. The shift was for a period of seven
hours. When he had reached the bottom of the mine he was
ordered by his employers to do certain work, and he wrongfully
refused to do it. He requested to be taken to the surface again;
but by the order of his employers, he was not allowed to use the
shaft elevator (which was the only means of reaching the surface)
until 1.3o o'clock. He brought an action for damages for false
imprisonment in respect of his detention. Lord Justices Buckley
and Hamilton held that the fact that the defendant did not grant
the plaintiff the facility for coming up to the surface did not constitute a false imprisonment. Hamilton, L. J., said that he would not
go into the question of whether it was or was not an implied term
of the contract that the employers should furnish the means of getting to the surface at any time, for even if there was such term, the
remedy for non-compliance would be an action for breach of contract, and it could not, merely because the plaintiff was detained,
be construed into the commission of a tort. Lord Justice Vaughan
Williams, dissenting, thought there was an unlawful imprisonment.
It is obvious that there is room for difference of opinion upon
the question; but to the mind of the writer the dissenting opinion
is the more reasonable view.
One may refer to the definition of Thorpe, C. J., in Year Book
of Assizes,' that a person is said to be imprisoned "in any case where
he is arrested by force and against his will, although it be on the
high street or elsewhere, and not in a house"; or to Sir Win. BlackFALSE IMPRISONMENT-IS THE REFUSAL TO

LENT

s21 Wall.

342

(U. S.

1874).

Herd v. Weardale Steel Co., Ltd., et al., iog L. T. 457 (Eng. 1913).
2 Fol. lO4, plac. 85 (1348).
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stone's definition that "every confinement of the person is an imprisonment"; but such definitions, couched in general terms, are of
little aid in determining a delicate question like the one before us.
It seems to be agreed that "the wrong may be committed by words
alone or by acts alone, or by both, and by merely operating 3on the
will of the individual or by personal violence, or by both." 4Furthermore, as held in the leading English case of Bird v. Jones, per
Coleridge, J., imprisonment is something more than mere loss of
freedom or ability to go wheresoever one pleases; it includes the
action of restraint within limits defined by a wall or an exterior
barrier.
Was there a restraint in the case before us? Lord Justice
5
Buckley answers the question in the negative; for, says he, the deto stay
will
his
against
plaintiff
the
compelled
have
must
fendants
in that place, and that is not true in this case: "It is quite true that
he could not leave the place, but he was detained in that place, not
by any act of his master, but by a certain physical difficulty arising
from the structure of the place. What kept him from the surface
was not any act which his master did. The master says: 'I am not
preventing you from getting out; get out by all means, if you can.
But you cannot call on me to take you out.' One man imprisons
another if he prevents him from leaving; but he does not imprison
him merely because he does not assist him to come out." This reasoning is on its face over-technical; the learned Lord Justice himself
admits that he reaches a technical result. It is a mere flippancy of
words to say to a man: "Get out if you can," when he himself controls the sole means of getting out. The law treats of actualities,
and not of abstract technicalities. Lord Justice Vaughan Williams
takes the practical and sensible view: "The case to my mind does
not differ a jot from the case where there is a staircase instead of a
lift, and the manager has the key of the gate in his pocket, but being
asked to open the gate which gives access to the stairs chooses to
refuse to produce the key, and thus of his own will prevents the
man from using the staircase for no other reason whatsoever than
of his own will."
Lord Justice Buckley seems to have been swayed by the idea
that it was not the employer's duty under the contract to furnish the
plaintiff the means of getting to the surface until the seven hours
had expired. This seems, however, to be confusing the contractual
relation and the social relation of the plaintiff and his employers. If
the plaintiff has broken his contract by quitting work before the
seven-hour period, he has subjected himself to liability in damages
for breach of contract. But plaintiff has not given up his liberty for
Garnier v. Squiers, 62 Kan. 321 (I9OO).
15 L. J. Q. B. 82 (Eng. 1845).
a rog L. T. at page 462.
'

380

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

a period of seven hours, and when he quit work, he had a right to
be given his freedom and could not be lawfully detained.
6
In a recent case in Maine, on very analogous facts, the court
decided, as Lord Justice Vaughan Williams did in the case under
consideration. There, the defendant had taken the plaintiff out on
a yacht, having promised to take her ashore whenever she desired;
but though the plaintiff several times requested the defendant to
take her ashore or to furnish her with a boat, the defendant refused
so to do. The court held that there was an unlawful detention; and
this though the suit was not based upon the defendant's failure to
keep his agreement to take the plaintiff ashore, but an action in tort
for false imprisonment.
Y.L.S.

PROPERTY-RIGHT1
TORs-DIVERSION

OF UPPER AND LOWER RIPARIAN PROPRIE-

OF WATER-For the first time in Massachusetts,

the precise point whether riparian rights include diversion in reasonable quantities for a proper use on property outside the watershed
has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. In an action by a
lower riparian owner on a small stream against an upper riparian
owner who by means of a pumping apparatus diverted large quantities of water to another estate belonging to it, but not contiguous
to the land adjacent to the stream, and also located in a different
watershed, it was held that the only question is whether there is
actual injury to the lower estate for any present or future reasonable use. The diversion alone without evidence of such damage
does not warrant a recovery even of nominal damages.'
It has been said that the rights of riparian ownership extend
only to use upon and in connection with an estate which adjoins the
stream and cannot be stretched to include-uses reasonable in them2
A
selves, but upon and in connection with non-riparian estates.
riparian proprietor is one whose land is bounded by a natural stream,
or through whose land it flows, and riparian rights are those which
he has to the use of the water of such stream, and grow out of and
3
depend upon the ownership of such land. A difficulty then arises
of land owned by one
tract
entire
of
an
in determining when part
person ceases to be riparian. There does not seem to be any rule
regulating such a question, and for this reason it seems best not to
confine the use to riparian lands and to exclude non-riparian.
In the main, it is true, the use by a riparian owner by virtue of
his right as such should be within the watershed of the stream, or
'Whittaker v. Sandford, 85 Atl. Rep. 399 (Me. 1912).
' Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, lO3 N. E. Rep. 87 (Mass. 1913).

2 Lord Cairns in Swindon Water Works Co. v. Wilt and Berks Canal
Navigation Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 697, 704, P05 (Eng. 1875).
3 Gould, Waters (3rd Ed.), §148; Kinney, Irrig., §57.
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at least, that the current of the stream shall be returned to its original bed before leaving the land of the user.4 This is implied in the
term "riparian." But this does not mean that the use shall be confined to strictly riparian lands. On the contrary, the courts have
frequently held that the extent of the exercise of the use of the
water is not to be determined by the area or contour of the land,
but by its effect upon other riparian proprietors.5 In general, the
right of a riparian owner to appropriate the water is limited to his
use for such purposes, to such an extent and in such a way6 as will
not be inconsistent with a similar use by the lower owners. Since
the effect upon the lower riparian proprietor is made the test, it
would make little difference whether the water was taken for use
on riparian or non-riparian lands, just so long as it did not essentially interfere with the exercise of the common right by the other
riparian owners. If the use is lawful and beneficial, it must be
deemed to be reasonable, and not an infringement of the right of
other riparian owners to whom it occasions no actual and perceptible
damages either as to the present or future use-of the riparian land.7
The question in such a case is not whether the diversion being for
a legitimate use and in quantity such as is reasonable, having regard
to all the circumstances, but only whether it causes actual damage
to the person complaining. 8 Were it otherwise, points out Mr. Chief
Justice Shaw in Elliot v. Fitchburg R. Co., and were it an inflexible
rule that each lower proprietor has a right to the full and entire flow
of the natural stream without diminution, acceleration or retardation
of the natural current, it would follow that each lower proprietor
would have a right of action against any upper one for taking any
portion of the water of the stream for any purpose.
The riparian proprietor's right to appropriate the water for his
domestic use and also for watering his cattle is not, however, accord'Kensit v. Great Eastern R. Co., L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 122 (Eng. 1884); 3
Kent. Comm. 439, "though the riparian owner may use the water while it
runs over his lands, he cannot unreasonably detain it or give it another
direction, and he must return it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his
estate."
'Jones v. Conn, 39 Or. 30 (ioi); Ulbrecht v. Eufawla Water Co., 86
Ala. 587 (1888); Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 (1884);
Norbury v. Kitchin, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 132 (Eng. 1863); Miner v. Gilmour, 12
Moore, P. C. C. 131 (Eng. 1858), "each proprietor may use the water for any
other purpose provided lie does not interfere with the rights of other proprietors above or below him."
63 Kent. Comm. 439; Elliot v. Fitchburg R. Co., io Cush. 191 (Mass.
1852): Garwood v. N. Y. C. & Hudson R. Co., 83 N. Y. 400 (188i); Mason
v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Adol I (Eng. 1833); Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W.
324

(Eng. 1843).

' Elliot v. Fitchburg, supra, Kensit v. Great Eastern R. Co., supra; White
v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 6o S. C. 254 (igoo); Baily & Co. v. Clark (1902), 1
Ch. 649 (Eng.); Harris v. R. Co., 153 N. C. 542 (1io).
6 Fifield v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 130 Cal. 552 (9oo).
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ing to the weight of authority, limited by considerations of the necessities of lower proprietors, and he may use the water for these
"ordinary" purposes, even though the effect be to exhaust the supply.9 On the other hand, his right to appropriate the water for what
are considered "extraordinary" uses, such as manufacturing, irrigation, and others, is restricted by the requirement that such appropriation must not so diminish the flow of water as to materially injure other proprietors lower down, 10 or, as stated by others, his use
of the water must not be unreasonable, having regard to a like use
by the lower proprietor.
There are numerous decisions to the effect that the rights of a
riparian proprietor do not extend to uses on land outside the watershed. In such cases, however, the fact appears that actual damages
were caused by the diversion." In Paterson v. East Jersey Water
Co.' it was held that the uses of water of a flowing stream must, in
order to be reasonable, be consistent with the occupation and enjoyment of the riparian lands; and, where a water company diverts
such a perceptible quantity as to exclude the application of the
maxim, "De minimis non curat lex," and such water is used to supply its customers, some of whom are located in a different watershed, such use is unreasonable and entitles a lower riparian owner
to relief by injunction without proof of actual damage. Here, however, the court said the continuance of such diversion may ripen into
a right of appropriation by prescription.
In reason, there seems to be no distinction between diversion
of water from a stream for use in the locomotive engines of a railroad, which of necessity consume the water by evaporation on their
journeys without perceptible return to any stream, and the diversion of water for any other legitimate use outside the watershed
and upon non-riparian land. Whether such a use for locomotive
engines is within the rights of riparian ownership has been the subject of somewhat variant conclusions as to the fact of reasonableness. A corporation with the right of eminent domain, which takes
the water of a stream for its corporate uses, not by exercise of its
right as such, but by virtue of its rights as riparian owner, has no
other or higher rights in the water than an ordinary riparian
owner.13 Sometimes the size and capacity of a stream has an im'Gould, Waters, §205; Spence v. McDonough, 77 Iowa, 46o (1889); Anthony v. Lapham, 5 Pick. 175 (Mass. 1827).
0Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353 (Eng. 185) ; Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa.
298 (1855) ; Gould v. Stafford, 77 Cal. 66 (1888) ; Anderson v. Cincinnati So.
R. Co., 86 Ky. 44 (887).
"Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277 (1883); Bathgate v. Irvine, 126
Cal. 135 (1899).
1274 N. J. Eq. 49 (19o8); affirmed 77 N. J. Eq. 588 (igio).
"McCartney v. Londonderry & Lough Swilly R. Co. (1904), A. C. 3o
(Eng.); Garwood v. N. Y. C. & Hudson R. Co., supra; P. R. R. v. Miller, 112
Pa. 34 (1886).
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portant bearing upon questions of this nature, 4 which are to a considerable extent questions of degree, depending for determination
upon the circumstances of each particular case. Sometimes the law
will say what is a reasonable use. Thus they hold in New Jersey,
that the sale of a right to take water for use on non-riparian lands
is unreasonable as a matter of law, if thereby another riparian proprietor sustains palpable damage.' 5 However, it is the general rule
that the question of reasonableness is one of fact and for the jury
to determine from all the circumstances. 16
S.L.M.
" Wheatley v. Chrisman, supra, note io.
"Higgins v. Flemington Water Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 538 (1883).
"Norbury v. Kitchin, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 132 (Eng. 1863) ; Gillis v. Chase, 67
N. H. 161 (189i); Hetrich v. Deachler, 6 Pa. 32 (1847).

